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INTRODUCTION
“I bought out my brother,”1 says Thomas, a Romanian-born farmer now residing in
Germany. “It was a financial transaction. My brother paid 10.000 Lei, and I gave him another
8.000DM. That was the price for a Banat Swabian2 back then. After about a year, he was allowed
to leave.” It is matter-of-fact, much like the rhetoric found in the transcripts of the negotiations
that sent more than 200,000 people from Romania to West Germany over a 20 year period and
allowed Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu to get out from under the control of the Soviet
Union.
While the paid emigration deal between Romania and the Federal Republic of Germany
is no longer a secret, it is rarely mentioned beyond a passing acknowledgement of it as a reason
for the decline of German-speaking minority groups in Romania. However, a migration of this
scale, which resulted in billions of dollars changing hands, has implications far beyond the
demographics of Transylvania and the Banat. An agreement such as this was made possible by a
perfect storm: a culturally well-preserved Romanian-German minority, a Romanian nation
drawing upon its distinct origins to pursue independence from the constraints of being a satellite
state, a world split into three groups in need of mediation, a divided Germany grappling with the
concept of German identity the aftermath of the Holocaust.
Dr. Heinz Günther Hüsch, the lawyer and Bundestag member who acted as the West
German representative during the negotiations, reflected on West Germany’s obligation to the
German diaspora, saying “On the one hand, prosperity and quality of life increased in the Federal
Republic; on the other hand, the standard of living in Romania fell steadily. Who could refuse the

1
2

Thomas Koch. Interview by Nicholas Hermann. Phone Interview. October 16, 2020.
Banat Swabians are one of the German-speaking minority groups in Romania.
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Germans in Romania the moral right to relocate to the Federal Republic?”3 Dr. Hüsch’s
justification draws on traditional ideas of German citizenship being ethnocultural and not
geographic. It is essential to note that Romanian-German communities existed long before any
official German nation, so the responsibility of Germany to this group only exists if one believes
in an idea of German citizenship based on these notions of blood and ancestry. While this
definition of citizenship might have been well suited for multi-ethnic empires, following the
post-Treaty of Versailles push for self-determination and the later German-nationalism violently
espoused by the Nazis, it becomes more complicated. As was the case in most Eastern European
lands, Romania had long been a multi-ethnic landscape, where it was common for four or five
ethnic groups to live in close proximity to one another.
Although West Germany engaged in population transfers with other Eastern Bloc
countries in exchange for financial benefits, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, the agreement
with Romania is unique for a number of reasons. Most notably, the compensation went beyond
general trade agreements or loans. Instead, each emigrant was appraised and assigned a price
based on their age, educational attainment, and skill. Whereas other deals, such as the 1975
agreement between West Germany and Poland that resulted in 125,000 Polish-Germans
migrating to West Germany in exchange for a low-interest $400 million loan to Poland, were
open diplomatic agreements between two nations that addressed the issue on the meta level,
Bonn’s deal with Bucharest was shrouded in secrecy and focused on the purchase of individuals.
Like Poland, Romania received large loans with favorable terms, but unlike Poland, the
Romanian Communist Party received hard currency for each departure, which they had no
obligation to repay or even spend for government-related purposes. These payments, which

3

Heinz-Günther Hüsch, Peter-Dietmar Leber, and Hannelore Baier. Wege in Die Freiheit :
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totaled well over 1 billion dollars, could easily have gone right into the pockets (or, more
accurately, the Swiss bank accounts) of Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu.
In his 1987 book Red Horizons, former-Securitate general Ion Mihai Pacepa alleges that
Ceaușescu had a larger plan, codenamed “Horizon,” which sought to obtain Western money,
technology, and political approval in an attempt to establish independence from the constraints of
the Warsaw Pact.4 With this in mind, one must evaluate the motives of the Romanian
government. Is it accurate to view this agreement as an attempt to homogenize the country’s
population and eliminate the threat of minority group opposition? Based on conversations with
those who have personal or familial connections to the situation, it’s not a simple answer.
According to Andras Elek, who is of Hungarian and Banat Swabian ancestry and spent his
childhood under Ceaușescu’s rule: “At a certain level, they considered everything to be a threat.
You weren’t able to move two steps without the Securitate knowing. But it was obvious that the
German community couldn’t have done anything big against the communists. The opportunity
was just better to sell them for money and foreign relations.”5
Characterizations of the deal range from it being a simple and logical population transfer
for purely humanitarian reasons to a government-run human trafficking ring that profited off of
the exploitation and suffering of those wishing to emigrate. On the one hand, the idea of putting a
price tag on a human being, determined by factors such as age and education, feels reprehensible
and dehumanizing. Ceaușescu himself is alleged to have said, “oil, Jews, and Germans are our
best export commodities,” and the transcripts of the negotiations generally echo this sentiment of
émigrés as just another product to be sold on the international market. On the other hand, unlike
other instances of humans being sold, the sale was consensual. Every Romanian-German “sold”
4

Ion Mihai Pacepa. Red horizons: The true story of Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescus' crimes, lifestyle, and
corruption. (1990): 8.
5
Andras Elek. Interview by Nicholas Hermann. Skype Interview. October 8, 2020.
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had to apply and, despite enduring a long process that often involved extortion and intimidation,
their quality of life would improve following their purchase. There was also logical reasoning
behind the payments that extended beyond notions of ownership over a person, as allowing
thousands of state-educated citizens to leave the country freely would be detrimental to the
construction of the independent and industrialized country Ceaușescu envisioned.
If categorizing it as a sale of humans feels like sensationalism, one could instead use the
word ransom, which makes some sense as it addresses the desire for those being ransomed to be
bought. However, ransom has the connotation of returning a prisoner or something that was
stolen. Given that Germans settled in Romania centuries ago, and at the time of the deals were
not prisoners in the literal sense, this term does not fully encapsulate the nuances of the situation.
The West German side codenamed the operation die Geheimsache Kanal, which roughly
translates to the Secret Channel. The Romanian side referred to it as Acţiunea „Recuperarea,”
which means the Recovery Action. In some ways, these titles are ironic, as it was the German
side who claimed the negotiations were a humanitarian mission to rescue Romanians of German
descent, while the Romanian side saw the negotiations as a channel to acquire Western funds and
influence while insisting on secrecy.
This paper attempts to reassess the sale of Romanian-Germans, specifically focusing on
the role it played in the formation of Ceaușescu’s Romania as a semi-independent state during
the Cold War. Minority groups, specifically Jews and Germans, were secretly at the center of
Romania’s foreign policy. Due to the division of East and West, the emigration of a minority
group in a country that had historically been in the shadows of greater powers would have huge
diplomatic impacts beyond the negotiating countries. The Romanian-Germans, who had a long
history of acting as a bridge between two sides (whether it be the Hungarians and Romanians in
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Transylvania or the Nazis and the Iron Guard in World War II), offered Romania a link to the
West, which signified independence from the Soviet Union. Initially under the guise of family
reunification, West Germany was able to provide support to the German diaspora, while
Romania traded the emigrants for hard currency and loans used to grow the economy, and took
on a greater level of global importance than ever before with strong relationships in the West,
East, and non-aligned countries. As was commonly the case in this period, the United States and
the Soviet Union sat in the background with a vested interest in Romania’s independence.
Without the sale of the German and Jewish minority groups, Romania would not have
been able to oppose the USSR in the same way, resulting in stronger Soviet control over the
Eastern Bloc and less communication across the Iron Curtain. Though not often acknowledged,
the sale of Romania’s Germans altered the dynamics of Cold War Europe. In the larger sense,
there is something to be said about the importance and validity of hyphenated identity. Without
the Romanian-Germans maintaining a cultural and linguistic tradition while resisting
assimilation over centuries, this natural link between nations would not have been possible. This
is a testament to the role of ethnicity and diaspora in diplomacy and the construction of
nationhood.

9

Figure 1.1. A Banat Swabian family (c. 1900) Photo courtesy of Andras Elek.

CHAPTER I: Romania’s German Minority (Pre-1969)
To understand the circumstances that allowed for the deal of 1969, one must first
understand how the Romanian nation had historically been shaped by interaction between
various ethnic groups, as well as how Romanian-German identity developed over time. While
there were several German-speaking communities throughout the land that makes up present-day
Romania, the two most prominent were the Transylvanian Saxons and the Banat Swabians. The
Transylvanian Saxons first arrived in Transylvania in the mid-12th century at the invitation of
King Géza II of Hungary. While the term Saxon refers to the German region of Saxony, the
Transylvania settlers came from all over modern-day Germany, as well as parts of France,
Luxembourg, and Belgium.6 Initially tasked with populating the region and defending the
Kingdom of Hungary’s southern border from invasion, they soon carved out a prominent role in
Transylvanian society. In 1224, Andrew II of Hungary issued the Diploma Andreanum, giving
the Saxons autonomy, allowing them to maintain German language and culture undisturbed by
6

Georges Castellan. “The Germans of Rumania.” Journal of Contemporary History 6, no. 1 (1971): 52.
https://doi.org/10.1177/002200947100600103.
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other groups in the region.7 The Saxon population settled in the areas around Hermannstadt
(Sibiu) and Kronstadt (Brașov).
The elevated status of the Saxons is illustrated by “Unio Trium Nationum” (The Union of
the Three Nations), a 1438 pact between the Transylvanian Saxons, Hungarian nobility, and the
Szekely, the initial Hungarian settlers of the region.8 Created in response to the Transylvanian
peasant revolt of 1437, this alliance provided the perceived three ruling “nations'' of Transylvania
mutual aid against potential Ottoman attacks and peasant uprisings. Given that Romanians made
up the majority of the peasantry throughout Tranyslvania’s history, the pact essentially signified
a German and Hungarian bourgeoisie that saw itself threatened by a largely Romanian proletariat
and the expansion of the Ottoman Turks.
Despite being the ethnic majority in the region, Romanians lacked the recognition and
privileges that the Saxons and Hungarians possessed. This perceived inequality remained central
to inter-ethnic relations for centuries, with 20th century Romanian intellectual Traian Bratu
proclaiming “compared to its overwhelmingly Romanian rural population, an urban population
that, for the most part belongs to other nationalities; its trade, industry, and a large share of
banking - and therefore, the main sources of wealth - are in the hands of these non-Romanian
inhabitants.”9 Although no official German state existed and, therefore, the Saxon settlements in
Transylvania can not be seen as a German colony in the traditional sense, the power dynamics
between the Saxons and the Romanians mirrored colonial societies to a degree.
The other major group, the Banat Swabians, arrived in the 18th century, following the
Treaty of Passarowitz, which awarded the Habsburg Monarchy significant territory that had
7

Daniel Ursprung. “‘The German Minority in Romania: a Historical Overview.” The German Minority in
Romania, Euxeinos, 19-20 (2015): 11. https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-133324.
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previously been under Ottoman control.10 The term Banat Swabian refers to the Banat, a
historical region that encompasses parts of modern-day Romania, Serbia, and Hungary, while the
Swabian part refers to the region of Swabia in southern Germany. However, like the Saxons, not
all Banat Swabians originate from Swabia. In contrast to the Saxons, the Swabians were much
more willing to cross cultural boundaries, as interaction and even intermarriage with neighboring
groups was not uncommon.11 While both groups were of German origin, they spoke different
dialects of German and differed religiously. The Transylvanian Saxons were overwhelmingly
Lutheran, while, like the Hungarians, the Banat Swabians were predominantly Catholic. The
Banat Swabians were on average wealthier than the Romanian and Serbian communities they
lived amongst, but they did not enjoy the same privileged status as the Saxons.12
On December 1, 1918, the Great Assembly of Alba Iulia occurred, officially uniting
Transylvania with the Kingdom of Romania. While it likely goes without saying, the acquisition
of Transylvania and the Banat was of enormous importance to Romania and was a significant
reason for their involvement in the First World War. Prior to the agreements, Romanian Prime
Minister Ion Brătianu alleged that in addition to the self-determination aspect of
ethnically-Romanian areas, the Banat was in fact promised by the Allies in exchange for
Romanian entrance into the war.13 Interestingly, when negotiations began to look less favorable,
Brătianu took a page from the future Ceaușescu playbook, playing the East against the West by
threatening to give the Bolsheviks control of Romania if the Allies did not award the Banat in
Romania’s favor.14 In this way, Romania’s historical disadvantage, being in the proximity of
powerful empires, was becoming its greatest tool.
10

Georges Castellan, 53.
Daniel Ursprung, 9.
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Georges Castellan, 53.
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Although having historically aligned with the Hungarian population, the Transylvanian
Saxons supported Romanian efforts to take over Transylvania, which went a long way when it
was time to decide the fate of the former Austro-Hungarian lands. This gesture illustrates the
Saxons’ changing position between the Hungarians and Romanians, which allowed them to gain
favor with the potential new ruling group, as they had done previously with the Hungarians. The
decision to support the union was primarily based on assurances made about the protection of
minority cultures. According to Georges Castellan, the Great Assembly of Alba Iulia promised
“complete national freedom for all cohabiting peoples', that is, the right of self-government, the
right to conduct education and judicial proceedings in their own language, and to be judged by
persons drawn from their own people', and to be represented in legislative bodies and the
government in proportion to their numbers.”15 There were some additional benefits too, such as
the fact that the Saxons and Romanians had a common struggle against Magyarization16 and that
Romania was a monarchy with a Hohenzollern king in Ferdinand I, who was born in the German
Confederation.17 While the Saxons would still be a minority in a country with a majority that was
arguably even more culturally distant than the Hungarians, the presence of a German king
provided some assurance that German cultural practices would be given a space to continue.
Despite the fact that, unlike Germany, Romania benefitted from the post-World War I
territory changes, aggressive fascist movements gained influence in both countries by the 1930s.
One movement of particular note is “The Legion of the Archangel Michael,” better known as
“The Iron Guard,” formed in 1927 by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, who happened to be of German
heritage on his maternal side.18 The Iron Guard was a rather bizarre, radical group that blended

15

Georges Castellan, 55.
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xenophobic and nationalist philosophies with Eastern Orthodox-Christianity. While this
movement advocated for a Greater-Romania exclusively for ethnic Romanians, the
Transylvanian Saxons were actually perceived as “full-fledged Romanian citizens” and therefore
the only exception.19 Romanian fascism was very anti-Semitic in nature, which allowed for a
relatively seamless alliance with Nazi Germany under the military dictatorship of Ion Antonescu.
The collaboration between Antonescu and Hitler also allowed for a stronger connection between
Romanian-Germans and the Germans of the Reich.
At the request of the Nazis, Romania agreed to not only treat the Romanian-German
minority fairly, but also ensure space for self-determination as promised by Alba-Iulia.20 This
agreement gave Romanian-Germans special privileges when it came to the establishment of
political entities, which opened the doors for more openly National Socialist groups to take
power in the Romanian-German community. Most notable was Andreas Schmidt’s appointment
as the leader of the German minority and the creation of the “National Socialist German Workers
Party of the Ethnic Germans in Romania” (Nationalsozialistische deutsche Arbeiterpartei der
deutschen Volksgruppe in Rumänien) in 1940. Schmidt himself had strong ties with SS
leadership, as he was married to the daughter of SS-Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger21, and
therefore would act on behalf of the Reich. Despite initial opposition from Antonescu and the
Romanian government, the Romanian-Germans were eventually allowed to enlist in the
Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS, in large part due to external pressure from Germany.22 This
illustrates an interesting dynamic regarding self-determination, as the Romanian-Germans were
19

Mircea Platon. “The Iron Guard and the ‘Modern State’. Iron Guard Leaders Vasile Marin and Ion I.
Moţa, and the ‘New European Order.’” Fascism 1, no. 2 (January 1, 2012): 76.
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20
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not only caught between two fascist dictators in Hitler and Antonescu, but also Andreas Schmidt,
whose role allowed him to become a dictator, not over a territory, but rather over an ethnic group.
In many ways, this is consistent with the history and later status of the Romanian-Germans, who
were able to use their presence in
both German and Romanian cultural
spheres to their advantage. That
being said, the Romanian-Germans
were of great use to Hitler, as at
least 61,880 Romanian-Germans
served

in

the

Waffen-SS

and

participated on all fronts of the
war.23
Following the end of World War II, the Romanian-Germans found themselves at risk of
discrimination for a couple of reasons. The first of which was the issue of Nazi collaboration.
While not all Romanian-Germans supported the Nazis, those who did were vocal and active
enough that there would undoubtedly be consequences, especially because Romania was now
under the Soviet sphere of influence. Perhaps the most notable punishment faced by the German
minority was deportation to labor camps in Siberia after Stalin declared that ethnic Germans
from all over Europe would be forced to rebuild parts of the Soviet Union as a form of
reparation.24 This policy had a massive impact on German minority groups in Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and especially Romania, as it had the largest ethnic German
population in Eastern Europe outside of the Soviet Union. Of the 551,049 ethnic Germans in
23
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non-USSR Eastern Europe counted by the Soviets, 421,846 of them lived within the borders of
Romania, and of the 112,480 people sent to forced labor camps, 69,332 were from Romania.25
Men between the ages of 17 and 45 and women between 18 and 30 were eligible for forced
labor, regardless of any personal guilt for the actions of the Nazis. However, women married to
Romanian men, people with one Romanian parent, and any clergy members were exempt.26
Although large-scale deportations occurred, the existing evidence tends to support the
notion that the Romanian government opposed such measures but was simply unable to go
against the Soviets. While Romania remained a sovereign state in theory, the Soviet Union
occupied the country from 1944 until 1958. Because ethnic Romanians historically didn’t
support communism, on top of the fact that the previous regime was a Nazi-allied fascist
government, the Soviet Union felt it necessary to place Soviets in prominent positions until a
strong enough Romanian communist base existed.27 This fact made opposition to any Soviet
wishes rather difficult. However, that didn’t stop some Romanians from trying. In 1945, the
Romanian government wrote a letter to the Soviet-installed Vice-President of the Allied
Commission for Romania, Vladislav Vinogradov, explaining that the request to deport ethnic
Germans would cost the country and that the Romanian government had a responsibility to
protect the interests of “all its subjects, regardless of their ethnic origin.”28 Further attempts were
made to get other allied powers involved, such as Great Britain and the United States, but both
agreed that Romania was under Stalin’s sphere of influence and it would be best to stay out of
it.29 These attempts ultimately failed, and the Romanian-Germans were sent off for five years,
eligible to return in 1949. While this certainly had a significant impact on the
25
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Romanian-Germans, it is important to emphasize that this was a shared experience of ethnic
Germans all over Eastern Europe, and that while the Romanian government did not prevent the
deportations, they did not support them either.
The second threat was related to their historical status as landowners and bourgeois. Now
that the Romanian Communist Party was in power, issues of class took center stage, and those
who had possessed economic privilege were now seen as the enemy of the state. This was
characterized by the term chiabur, the Romanian equivalent of the well-known Russian term
kulak. Chiabur is thought to be derived from the Turkish word kibar, meaning overly polished or
pretentious, and was reappropriated by the communists to refer to class enemies.30 Landowners
who resisted collectivization were labeled chiaburi and subjected to surveillance and potential
deportation to Soviet labor camps. While people of any ethnicity could be labeled a chiabur,
Romanian-Germans commonly received this label due to their widespread land-ownership and
wealth. For example, in 1952, it was determined that one Banat village had 29 chiabur
households, and of those 29, 26 were Romanian-German.31 While this did not explicitly target
Romanian-Germans on ethnic grounds, the historical inequality caused them to be
disproportionately impacted by communist policies. They were, however, prohibited from voting
for a period of time as a direct result of perceived Nazi collaboration.32
Under Petru Groza’s rule, there were significant attempts to integrate minorities into the
larger Romanian population, though Romanian-Germans were still not entirely accepted due to
perceived Nazi collaboration. In 1945, the Romanian state established thirteen ethnic

30
Smaranda Vultur, “The Role of Ethnicity in the Collectivisation of Tomnatic/Triebswetter (Banat Region)
(1949-1956),” Transforming Peasants, Property and Power: The collectivization of agriculture in Romania,
1949–1962. (2009): 155.
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organizations with the purpose of providing a path to integration for ethnic minorities.33 These
included organizations for both groups that would eventually be ransomed, with the German
Anti-Fascist Committee and the Jewish Democratic Committee. As the name would suggest, the
German Anti-Fascist Committee was dedicated to the de-Nazification of Romania’s German
community, as they were still seen as potentially sympathetic to Nazism. Similarly, the Jewish
Democratic Committee was anti-Zionist and primarily concerned with ensuring the loyalty of
Jewish citizens. Both of these groups acted as a form of re-education, where those deemed at a
higher risk of placing a perceived ethnic homeland above the nation of Romania were pressured
into assimilation. By replacing fascism and Zionism with communism, the hope was that these
minority groups would buy into the Romanian Communist Party, and any threat would be
neutralized. However, there were hints about what would happen if social restratification did not
take place. In a 1946 speech, Communist Minister of Justice Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu stated that if
ethnic Hungarians threatened state security, they would be resettled to Hungary.34 While this
statement was not necessarily endorsed by the Romanian government itself, it does suggest that
integration was Plan A, with deportation being Plan B. Not long after that speech, the state of
Israel was founded, and Romania began exporting its Jewish community.
Following the death of communist leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in 1965, it was
decided that Nicolae Ceaușescu would be his successor, causing some friction between the top
party members.35 The territory of modern-day Romania had always been ethnically diverse, but
Romanians were hardly ever the ones truly in power. Because of their close proximity to multiple
historical powers, Romanians found themselves under the rule of Hungarians, Russians, Turks,
33
Stefano Bottoni. “Reassessing the Communist Takeover in Romania: Violence, Institutional Continuity,
and Ethnic Conflict Management.” East European Politics & Societies 24, no. 1 (2010): 73.
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Greeks, Austrians, and European Royalty over time. While Ceaușescu was far from the first
ethnic Romanian to lead the nation, the fact that he was a Romanian was still meaningful to the
public. Dissident author Paul Goma noted, “the general feeling was, among the vast majority of
Romanians, okay, he’s a communist but at least he’s against the Russians, the Hungarians, the
Jews, etc. He’s one of us.”36
This anti-Soviet persona was crucial to the success of Ceaușescu, both at home and in the
West. According to the former Head of Romanian Intelligence, Ion Mihai Pacepa, Nicolae
Ceaușescu recognized the potential benefits of breaking from the Soviet Union in the eyes of the
West, saying “let’s present Romania as a Latin island in the Slavic sea ... Our millennia-old
traditions of independence are now up against Moscow’s political centrism ... A pawn between
two superpowers.”37 As Ceaușescu alludes to, Romania’s cultural heritage lent itself to a more
independent path, one that didn’t idolize Russia as a big-brother figure, compared to the other
overwhelmingly Slavic countries of Eastern-Europe. The Romanian people are thought to be
descended from intermixing between the Dacians, a Thracian people indigenous to the Balkans,
and the Romans, who conquered the region thousands of years ago.38 Despite bordering three
Slavic-speaking nations, as well as Hungary, the modern Romanian language is most closely
related to Italian, making Ceaușescu’s characterization of Romania as a “Latin island in the
Slavic sea” fairly accurate.
As surprising as it may initially seem, Romania’s official policy on ethnic minorities was
much more progressive than West Germany’s at the time. Keeping in line with communist
ideology, Ceaușescu publicly pursued a policy of integration, or “homogenization,” for
Romania’s minority groups. Historian Dennis Deletant presents three very connected main
36
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arguments that Romania was attempting to erase the culture of its minority groups, namely
Hungarians and Germans.39 The first deals with the movement of ethnic groups. Based on
decrees issued in 1976, the state could assign university graduates to jobs all over the country.
Members of the German and Hungarian minorities felt that they were often placed far away from
areas that had sizable German or Hungarian communities as an attempt to assimilate them. This
theory suggests that a person is more likely to marry and have children with someone close to
them, and therefore by placing a Banat Swabian in Dobruja, where there are very few Swabians,
they will find a Romanian partner and have children of mixed ethnicity. Because these children
would grow up away from their parent’s minority community, they would likely have less
connection to the culture, and after a generation or two at most, the family would identify as
Romanian and not Swabian. While there is some logic to the theory, this fate was seemingly
avoidable if one chose, as there was no official law forcing the intermarriage of ethnic groups.
Additionally, the official explanation for these practices is that workers were assigned positions
based on job availability, not ethnicity, as a way to combat unemployment. It must also be
acknowledged that in many cases, intermarriage did not lead to a loss of culture but rather a
fusion. “My great grandmother would speak to me in German, but I would speak back in
Hungarian as it was easier for me,”40 says Andras, whose family continues to maintain a strong
connection to their Hungarian and Banat Swabian roots, despite generations under communism.
Another piece of evidence supporting the idea that Romania engaged in forced
assimilation was the restricted availability of Hungarian or German language education in
schools. Under Law 26, a school was required to offer classes in Romanian if there was at least
one student whose native language was Romanian.41 On the other hand, Law 278 stated that
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there needed to be at least 25 German-speaking students to create a class in German at the
Primary School level. This requirement increased to 36 students at the Secondary level. This is
obviously unbalanced and favors Romanian-language education. With the changes in educational
requirements coupled with the increase of ethnic Romanians settling in traditionally German or
Hungarian areas, there was legitimate reason for concern about the availability of
minority-language education. However, on the flip side, the argument was made that keeping
minority groups educationally segregated was ultimately detrimental to both the student and
Romanian society as a whole. To Ceaușescu and others in powerful positions, the idea that many
Romanian citizens wouldn’t be completely fluent in the Romanian language was seen as a failure
of the state education system, with Ceaușescu declaring “Romanian is not a foreign language to
any youth living in Romania. It is the language of our socialist society and it must be learned by
all Romanian citizens.”42 While Romania was a multi-ethnic state, the majority of citizens were
ethnic Romanians, and if members of minority groups were expected to learn, work, and live in
the country of Romania, it was reasonable that they possess proficiency in the Romanian
language.
However, these policies are potentially more problematic in the case of the Hungarian
minority, given the dispute over Transylvania. As mentioned earlier, Transylvania, which was
previously part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, was given to Romania following World War I
and the Treaty of Trianon. Without any movement, the Hungarian population, who had
previously lived as citizens of Hungary, now found themselves as a minority group in a foreign
nation as a result of the redrawn borders. This increased ethnic tensions and the debate over who
has the right to Transylvania continues to this day. However, the Banat Swabians and
Transylvanian Saxons were always a minority group. Whether under Austro-Hungary, the
42

Ibid., 126.

21

Ottoman Empire, or Romania, they had always occupied a space outside of the territorial
boundaries of the German Reich. Because of this, there was no widespread resentment towards
the Romanian state related to territorial disputes on the part of the Germans. The German and
Hungarian experience differs significantly in this way, and the things that might have been
especially difficult or repressive for Hungarians were not necessarily so for the Germans.
While these two policies can be seen as evidence that the Romanian Communist Party
was anti-minority, they can also be interpreted more positively. These laws suggest that there is
an equal place in Romanian society for people of various backgrounds, so long as they are
willing to accept certain aspects of Romanian culture. There is nothing that directly forbids the
use of other languages or the practice of non-Romanian cultural traditions in daily life, only that
citizens must also know Romanian. While this policy is in line with communist ideas about
minority status, it is also quite similar to Western ideas around immigration. Whether it be the
integration of immigrants to the United States or even the case of the Aussiedler, who despite
being ethnically German still had to go through a process of integration into West German
society, most countries seem to agree that regardless of ethnic background, all citizens should be
able to speak the dominant language and exist outside their own ethnic community. This is
evidenced by the fact that many countries have language proficiency as a requirement for
citizenship. Interestingly, Germany would later find itself in a similar situation, as the integration
of Gastarbeiter43 and refugees from the Middle East became a defining issue of German politics
post-reunification.
The increase in German cultural representation, which had previously dwindled after
World War II, also contradicts the narrative of state-sponsored suppression of German identity. In
43

Migrant workers from Southern Europe and Turkey who moved to West Germany as part of the
Gastarbeiterprogramm in the mid-20th century. Their descendants make up some of Germany’s largest minority
groups today.

22

1969, Romanian public television introduced its first German-language program.44 That same
year, the German Nationality Workers Council was established.45 Additionally, the continued
operation of the German theater of Timișoara, the Adam Müller-Guttenbrunn literary circle
(whose membership included Richard Wagner and Nobel Prize winner Herta Müller), and the
publication of hundreds of original books in German suggest that German identity was very
much alive under Ceaușescu in the 1960s and 70s. While the existence of these programs does
not preclude all forms of cultural discrimination, it is at least evidence that the Romanian
government was not outwardly anti-German. Statements by Ceaușescu himself acknowledged
the value and importance of ethnic minorities in Romania’s history and future:
“Alongside the Romanian people have settled on large expanses in the course of
centuries, and are living side by side Romanians, Magyars, Germans and other
nationalities; everything that has been built, in the conditions of the past, but especially
the successes obtained at present in socialist construction, are the joint work of the
Romanian, Magyar and German working people and of those other nationalities who
benefit today from the results of the building of our new society.”46
Of course, public statements made by a politician, especially one as notorious as Ceaușescu,
should not be taken at face value. Many Romanian citizens, especially those of Hungarian
ancestry, might find this statement laughable. That being said, the acknowledgment of the
multicultural origins of the modern Romanian state is suggestive of a fairly inclusive official
stance.
The sentiment of a shared history between Romania’s ethnic groups was echoed by many
throughout the 1970s, specifically with the intent to discourage emigration in order to prevent the
loss of skilled citizens and the cosmopolitan character that had long existed in cities such as
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Timișoara. While the official negotiations were a secret from both the West German and
Romanian citizens, the desire of some Swabians and Saxons to emigrate was well known. This
desire was met with opposition from many sources, including Romanian-Germans. Eduard
Eisenberger, who was Chairman of the Council of Working People of German Nationality,
warned that Saxon and Swabian communities were at a greater risk of losing their identity by
emigrating to “a society which is not their own.”47 In 1977, Dan Zamfirescu, a Romanian literary
historian, told Radio Bucharest that “Romania refuses to make a deal out of the destiny of the
Saxons and Swabian population of German descent, for they are only remotely German in origin;
if you like, they are just as much German as the Americans are English, or the Austrians are
German.”48 At the time of these comments, Romania was eight years into the deal with West
Germany, and had already sent thousands of Romanian-Germans to the West.
Of course, many of the people who spoke out against emigration had ulterior motives.
Despite being of German descent, Eduard Eisenberger was Chairman of a group founded by the
Romanian Communist Party, and even if the group was more than a puppet for the regime,
whatever power it did have would decrease as Romanian-Germans left the country. Zamfirescu,
who was not of German descent, is noted for promoting Protochronism, a form of Romanian
nationalism focused on an idealized past, which was especially prevalent under Ceaușescu. This
certainly makes him biased on the topic of ethnic history, but it is also somewhat telling that, as
was the case during the fascist years, Romanian-nationalist narratives were inclusive of Saxons
and Swabians as part of the historical identity of Romania. This is in stark contrast to other
nationalist movements, such as 20th-century German nationalism, which placed notions of racial
purity over regional history. Of course, this should not be taken to mean that all Romanians felt
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this way, but rather to highlight the way that prominent voices pushed a narrative of inclusivity
for the Germans of Romania.
In many ways, the Romanian government’s treatment of the Romanian-Germans does not
appear to be about the erasure of minority culture, but rather the modernization of the
nation-state and the unification of people of various backgrounds under one government. With
the exception of the years following WWII, Romanian-Germans generally enjoyed a
model-minority status, being the closest ally group to both the Hungarians and Romanians, all
while avoiding the persecution that the Jewish and Roma minorities faced. This does not mean
that life wasn’t hard for the Romanian-Germans, only that their hardships were not caused by
their German heritage.
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Figure 2.1. West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (left) and Nicolae Ceaușescu during a state visit in January
1978.
Fototeca online a comunismului românesc. #44724X5179X5732

CHAPTER II: The Initial Negotiations (1969-1978)
Having established an understanding of the conditions for the Romanian-Germans
leading up to the first departures, it is important to acknowledge the diplomatic history that laid
the groundwork for the deals. The organized emigration of Romanian Jews began with the
“Jakober-Marcu Gentlemen’s Agreement” under Dej in the late 1950s. Henry Jakober, a
Bessarabian-born Jewish businessman from London with commercial interests in Romania,
revealed to Securitate General Gheorghe Marcu that the Israelis would be willing to pay
Romania for the emigration of Jews.49 This offer was initially declined, but Jakober continued to
push negotiations, and a one-time deal was eventually agreed upon in 1958. However, Dej had
been urged by Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev to take other forms of compensation instead of
hard currency, as it would appear better for Romania in the event that the existence of such a deal
was ever made public.50 The first transaction saw Jakober build an automated chicken farm in the
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village of Periș in exchange for the passage of 500 Jewish families.51 Dej was pleased with the
agreement and decided to approve more emigration in exchange for more farms. These farms
were all paid for by Jakober, owned by the Romanian Ministry of Interior, and staffed by
political prisoners, with Dej even advising Alexandru Draghici, the Minister of Interior, to “just
arrest the ones you need and then use them” if there were not enough prisoners in the jail to meet
labor demands.52
These developments continued through the early 1960s, with the construction of
numerous chicken, pork, cattle, and turkey farms, as well as a Kellogg's Cornflakes factory.53
While the Romanians were not directly receiving money from this agreement, the agricultural
production was being exported to the West in exchange for 8 to 10 million dollars annually.54 It is
not as cut and dry as the later agreements, but make no mistake, Dej was profiting immensely
from the sale of citizens, as well as what was essentially slave labor. For whatever face would be
saved by forgoing hard currency, as Krushchev advised, it would be hard to defend such
practices to the international community if need be. Unsurprisingly, this arrangement was kept
secret even from many within the Romanian leadership, and Dej was the only one with access to
the Swiss bank account containing the profits.55
Ceaușescu was unaware of this agreement until becoming Dej’s successor in 1965.56
Perhaps not yet realizing the benefit of such a deal, Ceaușescu ended the agreement and fired
Gheorghe Marcu, effectively halting Jewish emigration. However, by 1967 he had a change of
heart, bringing back Marcu and reopening communication with Jakober, though revising the
terms of the deal. Instead of agricultural development, Ceaușescu preferred to cut to the chase
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and demanded hard currency. The recently renewed Jewish emigration deal lasted for decades,
laying the foundation for the sale of an even larger minority group: the Germans.
The issue of family reunification for the Romanian-Germans had been present since the
end of World War II, though due to the political instability of Europe in the post-war era, official
diplomatic solutions would not be reached for some time. Instead, these issues were tackled by
other organizations such as the German Red Cross, who handled much of the family
reunification from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania, and the USSR in the 1940s
and 50s. In May 1948, the Romanian Red Cross agreed to handle specific reunification cases
referred by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and by 1950, over 100 reunifications
had been resolved.57 The efforts continued following the 1954 International Red Cross
Conference in Oslo, and from 1955 to 1967, 15,271 Romanian-Germans were able to enter West
Germany thanks to the work of the Red Cross.58 However, the majority of these departures took
place prior to 1963, as the Red Cross took a back seat after declaring that family reunification
should be taken on by governments.59
It should be noted that, at least initially, there was a distinction between family
reunification (Familienzusammenführung) and ethnic resettlement. Following the conclusion of
World War II, it was not uncommon for families to be separated by borders. In the case of the
Romanian-Germans, many who had been sent to Soviet labor camps were “returned” to
Germany, their perceived ethnic homeland, instead of Romania, their country of birth where their
relatives remained.60 Even if one had wanted to return to Romania, given the complicated nature
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of European borders in the post-war period, it was not as simple as taking a train from Berlin to
Bucharest. As the years went on, Romanian-Germans in the West continued to push for the
relocation of their spouses, parents, siblings, and children. Considering that many of the family
separations occurred as a result of the deportation and forced labor of ethnic Germans, the case
can easily be made that the issue was the product of anti-German sentiment in Eastern Europe.
The West German government remained interested in assisting the resettlement of
Romanian-Germans, though no official contact between the West German and Romanian
governments took place until May 1958, when a West German delegation, which included the
representative of the German Red Cross, traveled to Bucharest.61 The goal of the meeting was
said to have been related to trade, but the German side was keen on resolving the issue of the
German minority in Romania. The resettlement of first-degree relatives was eventually approved
by the Central Committee of Romanian Workers’ Party, though the criteria for departure was
very strict, and anyone who failed to obtain approval would live worse than before as a result of
revealing their desire to leave.62 This agreement lasted only a few months, as departures were
halted in October 1958 following an unspecified act of espionage. The West Germans attempted
to resume movement but were met with resistance from the Romanian side. The next strategy
employed by West Germany would be a media campaign, designed to put international pressure
on Bucharest. Unfortunately for the Federal Republic, Romania’s position was not swayed by the
negative press.
Talks cooled until 1961 when Henry Jakober offered to arrange the departure of 500
Romanian-Germans in exchange for $500,000. West Germany felt that 500 people was far too
low a percentage of the Romanian-German population (which was roughly 380,000) to warrant a
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deal and declined Jakober’s offer. No major developments occurred until May 1964, when the
Romanian Foreign Minister revealed on a visit to Bonn that the Romanian government would be
willing to accept a list of Romanian-Germans wishing to emigrate. By May 1966, over 13,000
names had been given to the Romanian side, but no progress had been made. That same year,
West German Federal Minister of Economics, Kurt Schmücker, was told by Romanian Prime
Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer that Romania would take a greater interest in cases of family
separation but that a large population transfer for the larger Romanian-German community
would not happen.63
Dr. Ewald Garlepp, a Stuttgart lawyer, had been dealing with cases of persecution against
ethnic Germans in Central and Eastern Europe since the mid-1940s. Working with the
Evangelical Church and other organizations, Garlepp managed to assist in resettlement and
family reunification on individual scales throughout the 1950s while building relationships in the
East. By November 1962, Garlepp had negotiated a deal with the Romanians to send $150,000
(coming from the West German government, German Red Cross, and relatives of the
Romanian-Germans) in exchange for 106 Romanian-Germans.64 While laying the groundwork
for future agreements, these exchanges were much smaller and less official than the ones that
would follow in later years.
In Fall 1967, Heinz Günther Hüsch, a lawyer from Neuss who had experience with
Romania from representing a toilet paper importer, was approached by CDU politician Ernst
Lemmer about Romanian-German repatriation. While the work of Dr. Garlepp was certainly
meaningful, the German side hoped to widen the scope of the deals, with Hüsch saying, “we
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wanted justice for everyone, not just the wealthy with money.”65 Hüsch got on board the project
and, following Dr. Garlepp’s 1968 visit to Bucharest, took a leading role in the negotiations. The
records of Heinz Günther Hüsch, published in 2016 as Wege in die Freiheit: deutsch-rumänische
Dokumente zur Familienzusammenführung und Aussiedlung, serve as one of the foundational
sources of information on the secret exchanges.
As for the West German side, the deals
offered some value in the development of
post-war German society, both culturally and
politically. First and foremost, it should be
noted that there was a genuine humanitarian
interest in the Romanian-Germans, and the
writings of Dr. Heinz Günther Hüsch
highlight this: “as a Rhenish Catholic who
lived through the National Socialist era and
was beaten up as an altar boy by the Hitler Youth, I had a lot of sympathy for those who were
stuck there. Our prosperity exploded while in Romania the material situation was noticeably
falling.”66 The mass expulsion of Germans in Eastern Europe following World War II, largely as
a result of the violent German nationalism perpetrated by the Nazis, left the West Germans with
some degree of responsibility for the diaspora that had been displaced and suffered due to the
actions of their ethnic homeland. As previously noted, members of the German diaspora played a
huge role in the crimes of the Third Reich, but many who faced anti-German retribution were
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innocent. It is this duty to perceived fellow Germans that drove people like Dr. Hüsch and
Chancellor Kohl to take action, even if there was not a societal consensus:
“The desire to preserve Germanness and at the same time to prevent resettlement came
about at times when the people were not prepared to give up any of their prosperity and
to limit the pursuit of even more prosperity. [...] Even if not all cases were driven by the
desire for family reunification, rather by economic wishes, it was understandable that
many parents wanted a safe and free future for their children. Compared to the wish to
preserve Germanness, the right to freedom and life, to integrity and future had to be
valued much more highly for the next generation. I have therefore often taken the
opportunity and seen the need to counter doubts about the correctness of the German
approach. However, such doubts never existed with Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl. He
was permeated by the fact that with increasing selfishness in German society it would
only be possible for a limited time to make financial sacrifices for the return of the
Germans to freedom.” - Hüsch67
Hüsch’s characterization of the internal debate is interesting for a number of reasons, most
crucial being the suggestion that to not intervene on behalf of the Romanian-Germans would be
selfish, and Chancellor Kohl’s belief that the window of opportunity was closing due to
increased prosperity and in turn “selfishness” in West Germany. On the one hand, equating lack
of concern for the Romanian-Germans on the basis of shared heritage with selfishness had some
questionable implications to many on the Left. Considering that the official position of West
Germany was “wir sind kein Einwanderungsland''68 (we are not a country of immigration), one
could argue that assisting ethnic Germans in other countries on the basis of ethnicity was, in fact,
incredibly selfish and simply a rehash of the German ethnonationalism seen in the 1913
nationality law and the later Nuremberg laws. Would it be such a bad thing if a German speaker
in Bonn didn’t value the well-being of a German speaker in Transylvania more than the
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well-being of a Turk in Anatolia? On the other hand, there was a logical link between the
German speakers of Eastern Europe and West Germany, especially considering historical
German definitions of citizenship. It is the classic dilemma of nationalism, only made more
complicated by the legacy of Nazism and the division of Germany.
However, hundreds of thousands of lives were improved by the West German initiative to
organize the departure of Romanian-Germans, and to imply that West Germany should not have
helped, in an effort to be equally indifferent to the suffering of all peoples, would be to say that
it’s worse to be a hypocrite than a bystander. Kohl’s hunch that the public’s sense of duty to help
the “Volksdeutsche”69 was running out could be framed as an attempt to use the problematic
legacy of Pan-Germanism for something good before letting it die. By resettling Germans from
Eastern Europe in the Federal Republic, West Germany’s goal was in some ways the exact
opposite of Lebensraum, the settler-colonialism of Eastern Europe that had long been central to
German nationalism. Hüsch mentions

that some

sections

of society wanted

the

Romanian-Germans to remain there in order to maintain German identity outside the country,
which Hüsch dismisses, saying “compared to the wish to preserve Germanness, the right to
freedom and life, to integrity and future had to be valued much more highly for the next
generation.”70 Can one make the argument that to offer special help to a population who never
lived within the borders of the country only out of a sense of shared ethnicity is problematic?
Sure. But to not help them could also be seen as equally, if not more, troublesome. This is where
the debate gets truly difficult, specifically regarding West German aid to the Transylvanian
Saxon and Banat Swabian communities that were not emigrating.
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German-speaking communities had been an important part of the region for nearly 800
years, and erasure of that culture would be tragic in a way. However, if Romanian-Germans were
automatically eligible for West German citizenship by virtue of ethnicity, while non-German
Romanians were not, it would imply that they were Germans and not Romanians. In this case,
there should be no extra effort to maintain German culture in Romania. Either the Transylvanian
Saxons and Banat Swabians were of West German nationality, and therefore the Romanian
government had no responsibility to protect this culture, or they were Romanians, and the West
German government had no responsibility to repatriate them. While both of these options fail to
perfectly address the complexity of diaspora, not picking one gives the Germans of Romania an
especially privileged and unique status above both Romanian and West German citizens. The
West Germans, or at least the CDU, viewed the Romanian-Germans as West German citizens but
were not allowed to facilitate the departure of the entire population due to Romania’s reluctance.
Does this make West German investment in the well-being and cultural preservation of the
Romanian-Germans left behind a humanitarian duty to its citizens or something slightly
neo-colonialist that undermines the Romanian government?
One clear example of this debate is found in a transcript of a 1987 meeting between Dr.
Hüsch and the Romanian representative, Col. Constantin Anghelache.71 In the meeting, Hüsch
expresses concern about the food shortages and overall unrest in Romania, before offering to
provide aid to the cities of Brasov, Sibiu, Timișoara, and Târgu Mureș, which, as Dr. Anghelache
points out, are the cities with significant German populations.72 Hüsch responds to this by
explaining that this is intentional, as the plan is meant to provide aid to the Germans specifically,
though the goods would go through normal organizations and be open to people of all
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backgrounds, as long as they live in the area. Dr. Anghelache asks about aid to the city of
Constanța, where the population is primarily Romanian with Turkish and Tatar minorities. When
Hüsch admits that it hadn’t occurred to him to deliver there, despite the fact that it was roughly
tied for Romania’s second-largest city, Anghelache tells him that Romania can not distribute aid
to just one part of the country. Hüsch assures him that the aid would be kept a secret, implying
that the Romanian side would not need to answer for any preferential treatment. If the German
side were truly interested in helping Romanians of non-German origin, logically, they would
give aid to the whole country instead of trying to persuade the Romanian government to allow
for aid to be given to a specific region. While Hüsch mentions that other ethnic groups could also
receive the aid, it is very clear that by targeting German cultural centers, the intention was to help
Germans specifically.
Of course, there was significant reluctance on the part of the Romanian side to accept any
aid, so it is likely that even if West Germany were to agree to distribute aid equally across all
regions, Romania still would have declined. In the same meeting, Dr. Anghelache calls the
reports of the dire situation in Romania exaggerated and claims that “the only purpose of this
propaganda is to lure away people who have a technical or highly qualified job.”73 Because aid
from the West could be seen as part of a larger conspiracy to undermine the Ceaușescu regime,
which given the dynamics of the Cold War, was not unreasonable, West Germany had little
opportunity to genuinely help the situation. This once again gets back to the heart of the issue: is
it better to help some, even if you can not or choose not to help all? The ideology behind these
deals was one that undoubtedly valued those who were culturally German more than any other
group, but it was also unreasonable to expect West Germany to protect the well-being of all the
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Earth’s peoples, lest they be seen as embracing the ethnonationalism that destroyed much of
Europe decades earlier.
Another, more cynical motive for the interest in Romanian-Germans was a partisan one.
The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the conservative party that Helmut Kohl and Heinz
Günther Hüsch were members of, was typically more outspoken in favor of the interests of the
German diaspora. Many ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe, referred to as
Aussiedler, tended to be more conservative in their views and, having lived under communism,
were wary of the socialist policies pushed by West Germany’s more left-leaning parties making
them natural CDU voters.74 There certainly was a political advantage to bringing in the
Romanian-Germans, expanding the constituency of the CDU.
Though Romanian-German migration was a primarily CDU cause, the agreements
existed under the leadership of Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, both members of the Social
Democratic Party (SPD). Brandt is well known for his advocacy of Ostpolitik: the improvement
of relations between West Germany and the Eastern Bloc countries, ultimately with the goal of
reuniting Germany. The position previously held by West German leadership, based on the
Hallstein Doctrine, was that West Germany represented the sole legitimate state of the German
people and that any country that recognized East Germany would no longer have diplomatic ties
with West Germany. Ostpolitik argued that the Hallstein Doctrine did more harm than good for
the future of Europe and advocated for official diplomatic relations with the East, especially
between the two German states. Willy Brandt became Chancellor in 1969, the same year of the
first departure agreement with Romania, and soon led the overhaul of West Germany’s policy
towards Eastern Europe by signing the Treaty of Moscow and the Treaty of Warsaw in 1970,
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officially recognizing Poland. This was followed by the Basic Treaty of 1972, which established
diplomatic relations between East and West Germany.
Ostpolitik was continued to an extent by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who continued to take
an interest in the fate of the Romanian-Germans throughout the 1980s. According to Dr. Hüsch
“[Kohl] also saw the agreement with the Romanian side as a methodological means of
persuading the government of the GDR to be more accommodating in the humanitarian sector.”75
Based on this statement and the fact that the beginning of the relationship between West
Germany and Romania coincided with the implementation of Ostpolitik, it seems quite probable
that the departure of Romanian-Germans and payments to Ceaușescu’s government were carried
out, at least partially, in the name of Ostpolitik.
While these agreements were of value to the West German government, it was Ceaușescu
who truly benefited from the partnership. Pleased with the results of the Jewish ransom to Israel,
Ceaușescu began exploring a similar strategy with the German minority, which due to larger
numbers, was seen as having even greater potential for profit.76 On March 7, 1969, the West
German and Romanian sides signed the first written agreement in Stockholm, which would send
at least 3,000 Romanian-Germans to West Germany between March 15, 1969 and March 14,
1970. In this first batch of departures, eligibility was limited to a few types of relationships or
otherwise extenuating circumstances. For cases of family reunification, it had to be immediate
family members, meaning only parents, children, spouses, and siblings were eligible. However,
there were also “Hardship Cases”, in which war victims, prisoners, the seriously ill, and those
unable to work were also eligible.77 These qualifications would not encompass all of the
Romanian-Germans who wished to leave, but it was a solid start for the two governments.
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Compensation for the different types of departures varied. It was agreed upon that those
wishing to leave would be divided into three groups, each with a flat rate for departure to be paid
by the West German government.78 Group A consisted of the elderly and those without any level
of higher education. The members of this group cost 1,700 DM a head (equivalent to $3,030 in
2021). Group B referred to those in the process of getting a degree and cost 5,000 DM
(equivalent to $8,900). Group C were those who had a degree and were actively contributing to
the workforce. This group was the most valued at 10,000 DM per person (equivalent of
$17,800). These groupings would continue to be revised and expanded in the decades to come,
but it provided a basis for the value of the departures. The cheapest would be those who could
not contribute to the West German or Romanian economy (the elderly past working age) or those
who had not completed a Romanian education, meaning that the country had not invested as
much in their training and development. Group B housed potential but would require additional
schooling or training to be fully ready to contribute to society, hence the mid-range price. Group
C was the most valued commodity, given that they were highly trained and skilled individuals
whose arrival would most benefit West Germany and departure would most hurt Romania.
While it may be a very blunt and dehumanizing way to discuss human beings, there is
logic behind it. Under communism, Romania had invested significantly in its citizens' training
and education, which in theory would then be repaid through decades of service to the country.
To allow some of the best and brightest of Romania’s workforce to take their skills elsewhere
would quickly hinder the development of the nation and undermine the communist system as a
whole. By assigning a price to prospective emigrants based on age, education, health and other
factors, the Romanian government was at least compensated for the loss of valuable citizens. It is
especially important to consider the historical reputation of Romanian-Germans as well. As
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previously mentioned, the Saxons and Swabians had the reputation of being skilled and valuable
members of society. A similar reputation existed for the Jews, though it was complicated by
widespread anti-Semitism. Given this model-minority status, the Romanians would need to be
enticed by the potential return in order to give up these assets.
After the expiration of the first agreement, which sent approximately 2,500
Romanian-Germans west, Bonn and Bucharest began work on another deal. This second
agreement would be larger in scope but also contain more stipulations. The Romanian side
agreed to send at least 20,000 Romanian-Germans between March 1970 and December 1973.
However, if the number of departures reached 40,000, there would be additional benefits. The
cheapest group, Group A, was made up of men over the age of 62, women over the age of 60,
and those who did not fall under any of the other categories and cost 1,800 DM ($3,250).79
Group B was split into two categories, B1 and B2. B1 were those who had gone above minimum
schooling and carried a price of 5,500 DM ($9,920). B2 were those who had gone above
minimum schooling and were in the final 2 years of their training, raising their value to 7,000
DM ($12,600). Anyone who had completed university with a degree was placed in Group C,
valued at 11,000 DM ($19,800). The final group, Group D, consisted of those who had a job but
did not have any level of higher education. Members of this group were valued at 2,900 DM
($5,230). However, there was a special condition that no more than 20% of the emigrants could
be from Group D, and if it exceeded that, then the additional Group D departures would be
placed in Group A. This ensured that Romania would not disproportionately send it’s
least-skilled workers.
The compensation would come in chunks, with West Germany providing 600,000 DM
($1,080,000) on December 31, 1970, another 600,000 DM on December 31, 1971, and a third
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payment of 800,000 DM ($$1,740,000) due on September 30, 1973. If 30,000 departures were
reached, West Germany would pay 3,000,000 DM. If 40,000, it would go up to 4,000,000 DM.
In addition to the cash payments, West Germany agreed to provide a commercial loan to
Romania of up to 100 Million DM ($158,000,000) with favorable terms.80 There were also
smaller “gifts”, including 1 BMW 2000, 4 Ford Taunus XL, and 1 Mercedes 280 SE (with
special equipment).81 According to Securitate records, this special equipment referred to film
projectors and speakers installed in the van.82 Another Securitate record, a note from Gheorghe
Marcu (using the codename Dorin Pavelescu) to Ion Stanescu, reveals that an exchange took
place on October 12, 1971, in which the Securitate received dozens of radios, tape recorders,
camera, and a Grundig Closed Circuit TV system83 from West Germany free of charge.84 Also
included in the transaction were four automobiles, three hunting rifles, tear gas, and 2,100,000
DM ($3,810,000). The hunting rifles were reportedly for Ceaușescu himself. There is an amusing
anecdote involving the procurement of these rifles, courtesy of Hüsch.85 The exchange was
initially supposed to occur in Paris, but the Romanian middleman got stuck in Cologne. Upon
hearing this, Hüsch went to pick him up and allowed him to stay at his home with his family,
where the Securitate agent spent time teaching Hüsch’s son the Butterfly stroke in the family’s
pool. While it is never explicitly stated that these West German supplies were ever used for
unethical purposes, it seems almost implausible that one of the most repressive surveillance
states of the 20th century would request these materials for a purpose other than surveillance.
On the topic of espionage, Pacepa alleges that Ceaușescu attempted to use the German
and Jewish emigrants as spies, telling him in 1972 that “no Romanian citizen of Jewish or
80
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German descent should be given an emigration visa unless he has signed a secret agreement with
the security forces and has agreed to act as an intelligence agent abroad.”86 Not a lot is known
about this practice, as it seems that it was not particularly fruitful. Pacepa does mention that
while most of the German emigrants never reported back to the Securitate, the country with the
most agents uncovered in West Germany in 1972 was Romania.87 Because of the lack of
information on this topic, no major conclusions can be drawn. However, if this is legitimate, it
demonstrates Ceaușescu’s desire to take advantage of every possible opportunity to gain leverage
over his Western trade partners.
The next deal was agreed upon on April 4, 1973, with the goal of reaching 40,000
departures by June 30, 1978. This would require roughly 8,000 departures a year. Importantly,
the departures were now referred to as “legal emigration” instead of “family reunification.”88 The
rates stayed the same, but there were adjustments made to the loans. The agreement states: “The
foreign trade bank of the Socialist Republic of Romania will take out a loan of up to 200 million
DM from a German bank named and arranged by the German contractual partner. This loan is
granted for a period of eight years. There is no repayment for the first four years. In the last four
credit years it is repaid with 1/4 of the loan amount.”.89 This loan would equal approximately
$434,000,000 in 2021. It was also agreed that the Romanians could request up to 50% of the
payment be made in banknotes, which would not require a written receipt of the transaction.90
From June 11 to August 27, 1973, 2,211 Romanian-Germans arrived in West Germany, costing
the country 6,400,200 DM ($14,000,000).91
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Upon the expiration of the 1973 agreement in 1978, the two sides negotiated another deal
in Vienna. This deal did away with the groupings, instead opting for a flat rate of 4,000 DM per
person, which though lower than the higher end departures, was on average 700 DM ($1,362)
more than they had been paying. It is said that a quarterly payment of 8 Million DM was
transferred to account #180-03 of the Romanian Foreign Trade Bank at the Frankfurt-Bucharest
Bank.92 While the sale of Romanian-Germans was proving to be quite lucrative for Ceaușescu,
the benefits to Ceaușescu’s bank account were matched by the diplomatic advantages the
collaboration with West Germany provided.
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Figure 3.1. Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescu with U.S President Richard Nixon and First Lady Pat Nixon during a 1973
visit to the White House. Image courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration. Photograph by Robert
L. Knudsen.

CHAPTER III: The Construction of the Maverick State (1964-1989)
In order to make claims about the diplomatic benefits these deals gave to Romania’s
status as a maverick state, one must first understand the relationship between Romania and the
Soviet Union. As previously alluded to, Ceaușescu took after Mao and Yugoslavia’s Josip Broz
Tito when it came to his stance on the Soviets. Following the Prague Spring, Ceaușescu became
a symbol of resistance against Soviet aggression in the eyes of the West, but there has since been
much debate over the legitimacy of this persona. While it is perhaps giving too much credit to
paint Ceaușescu as a brave and rebellious leader, evidence suggests that the Soviet government
was forced to treat Romania differently than the other Eastern bloc countries due to their
non-conformist leadership. American historian Larry Watts has even gone so far as to use the
term “clandestine war” when referring to the Soviet Union’s policy towards Romania.93
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Prior to communism, relations between Romania and Russia were a mixed bag. On the
one hand, it was with the help of the Russians that Romania was able to gain independence from
the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. However, unlike the Serbs and
Bulgarians, Romanians are not a Slavic group and therefore lacked the special pan-Slavic
relationship with Russia that other Balkan states had, instead admiring France and Italy due to a
shared Latin heritage. Of course, there was also tension around Russian claims to the ethnically
Romanian Bessarabia, and a general fear of Russian imperialism was prevalent. By the early
1960s, Moscow and Bucharest were drifting due to the COMECON proposal of shared economic
planning between the Warsaw Pact countries. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, who hoped to
industrialize Romania, saw this proposal as limiting Romania’s potential for industrial growth, as
well as its sovereignty.94 In April 1964, the Romanian Worker’s Party declared its intention to
resist socialist internationalism and maintain economic independence, denouncing Soviet
interference in the affairs of other communist countries. Just a year before his death, Dej had laid
the groundwork for the eventual maverick state that his successor, Nicolae Ceaușescu, would
build upon.
When Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej died of lung cancer in 1965, many, including Ceaușescu,
believed that he had, in fact, been irradiated by the KGB, as it was said that Dej’s symptoms
began with throat pain after a trip to Moscow.95 Whether true or false, this conspiracy lingered in
Ceaușescu’s mind, and after developing a sore throat following a visit to the USSR, Ceaușescu
believed that he too had been the target of an assassination attempt by the Kremlin. After weeks
of examination by doctors, both from Romania and abroad, it was determined that the pain was
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the result of vocal cord irritation, with a West German doctor bluntly telling the Romanian
leader, “you talk too much and too loudly.”96
While Dej had begun forming ties to the West, it was Ceaușescu’s condemnation of the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia that resulted in the most tension between Romania and the
rest of the Eastern Bloc. Ceaușescu’s motivation for the opposition was not to protect a sense of
democracy and human rights but rather, it was based on the desire for Romania to remain
independent and the fear that he too could be pushed out by the superpower to the east.
Immediately following his speech condemning the invasion and speaking out against Soviet
intervention on August 21, 1968, Ceaușescu created Gărzile Patriotice (the Patriotic Guards),
stating that this militia “formed of workers, peasants and intellectuals shall be immediately
reorganized in order to assure the Romanian people's peaceful work, the homeland's national
sovereignty and independence.”97 The formation of this citizen’s army was explicitly aimed at
preventing a Soviet invasion and remained in operation until 1989, when it was made up of
700,000 men and women.98 Meanwhile, Moscow and the Soviet satellite states began collecting
data on Romania as if it were a Western country, with Romania now a secondary target in the
anti-China INTERKIT operation due to the budding Romanian-Chinese relationship.99 Soviet
records from 1978 are evidence of this concern: “it is impossible not to observe that China, in
developing its relations with Romania, pursues the aim of creating a single international front in
the struggle against the USSR.”100
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Like Dej before him, Ceaușescu was focused on industrializing Romania and creating a
multifaceted economy that could increase the country’s international influence, which would
require support beyond the Eastern Bloc. Having joined the International Monetary Fund and
World Bank in 1972, the Romanian Communist Party saw a legitimate path to becoming the
third or fourth most important communist country, something that frankly should not have been
possible given Romania’s lack of production and minimal cultural influence outside its borders.
Though it is certainly debatable to claim that Romania ever truly achieved this, it is undeniable
that, under Ceaușescu, the country took on greater importance than it likely should have. Much
of this was the result of Ceaușescu’s desire to act as a mediator on world conflicts. For example,
Richard Nixon’s 1969 visit to Bucharest was the first time an American president had visited a
Warsaw Pact country. The trip was made in part to ask Ceaușescu to bridge the gap between the
United States and China and assist in resolving the issue of the Vietnam war, with Nixon telling
Ceaușescu, “we would welcome your playing a mediating role between us and China.”101 This
role potentially undermined the Soviets, especially since Ceaușescu was having some degree of
influence on U.S foreign policy. Nixon admitted at a National Security Council meeting that
while he had previously seen the Soviets as more reasonable than the Chinese, Ceaușescu
disputed this and convinced Nixon that Moscow was actually more aggressive.102
Another noteworthy aspiration of Ceaușescu’s was solving the Israel-Palestine conflict,
which created some very interesting diplomatic challenges. While Romania was the first Warsaw
Pact country to recognize the state of Israel and engage in significant trade (most importantly of
human beings), Ceaușescu was seen as a true friend of the Arab world. He would frequently host
Yasser Arafat, the Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, providing money to the
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Palestinians, as well as collaborate with noted anti-Zionists Muammar Gadaffi and Sadam
Hussein

on

various

projects.

However, Ceaușescu did play a
role in arranging the visit of
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to
Jerusalem in 1977, a historic
moment, as it marked the first
Arab leader to officially visit Israel
and eventually led to the signing of
the Camp David Accords and the
Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. Truth be told, Romania had no real business getting involved in the
Middle East or the Vietnam War, but Ceaușescu’s love of diplomacy helped propel the nation to
the role of a miniature power. He could market himself as a “good communist” to the West and
play on Romania’s struggle against imperialism to forge connections with the leaders of the
so-called third world. This ability to play all sides without taking a firm position is what the
Soviets perceived as a threat. The prospect of conflict with the Soviets and their satellite states
was undoubtedly frightening for the Romanians, but with NATO and China on Romania’s side,
the Soviets would have to think twice about meddling in the affairs of their Balkan neighbor.
According to British historian Christopher Andrew’s assessment of KGB records, Soviet
spies were tasked with collecting information about “Romanian relations with the United States
and China; Romanian claims on Soviet territory in Bessarabia and north Bukovina; the political
and economic basis of opposition to the Soviet Union; the position of the German and Hungarian
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minorities; the Ceaușescu cult; and the state of the Romanian Communist Party.”103 The fact that
Romania’s minorities were of interest to the Soviets is suggestive of a perceived vulnerability in
the nation that could be exploited for diplomatic gain. While there is no way to say for certain, it
has been suggested that if enough unrest occurred amongst the minority groups, the Soviets
could use it as an excuse to invade and overthrow Ceaușescu.104 This might sound a bit paranoid
on the part of Ceaușescu, but there is some evidence to support the validity of such a threat.
Though not much information is known, it has been alleged that the Securitate discovered a
Soviet plan termed Dnestr, which involved replacing Ceaușescu with a Soviet-backed puppet
government.105 Although Yugoslavia and China had already paved the way for anti-Soviet
Communism, Romania was a much smaller country than China and, unlike Yugoslavia, shared a
border with the USSR. For this reason, Ceaușescu could not allow the situation for minority
groups to deteriorate, which might have influenced the decision to ramp up Romanian-German
emigration. In this regard, the deals offered multiple benefits, not only improving the situation
for some minority groups, if only in the short term, but also establishing closer relationships with
West Germany, Israel, and in turn, the United States.
Even dating back to the Dej regime, Romania’s relationship with NATO was heavily
dependent on the emigration of minority groups. Because of Israel’s interest in the repatriation of
Romanian-Jews, an issue that also had substantial support from American Jewish organizations,
the United States was inclined to monitor the situation. By 1963, the fate of the Jews, coupled
with Dej’s move towards independence from the Soviets, led the United States to become active
players in the ongoing negotiations. William Crawford, the head of U.S legation in Bucharest,
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communicated to the Romanian deputy minister of foreign affairs that “Romanian-American
relations could best be improved were Bucharest to let more people emigrate, especially those
seeking family reunification.”106 Romania complied, with hopes of one day achieving Most
Favored Nation trade status with the United States, which would allow for greater international
trade opportunities and a seat at the table beyond the Warsaw Pact nations. It was becoming clear
that Romania’s minority groups offered an opportunity to help break with the Russians and
achieve global power that had long eluded the largely underdeveloped, perpetually conquered
nation. However, the road to Most Favored Nation status was a long one, not being achieved
until 1975, in part due to Romanian reluctance to increase emigration.
The congressional hearings regarding Romania’s MFN status dwelled on the issue of
emigration for some time, as the number of approved émigés to the United States and other
Western nations in 1975 had decreased significantly from the previous year, giving the
impression that Romania was beginning to restrict emigration.107 This was an issue because
freedom of emigration is theoretically a factor in a country’s MFN eligibility. The Romanian side
pushed for the emigration issue to not hold as much weight in the decision, arguing that for a
developing country, the continued loss of the skilled and educated Jewish minority would be
harmful to future development. While this is true, Ceaușescu’s alleged enthusiasm for ransoming
off minorities makes it likely that this was largely a negotiation tactic. After all, if Jews and
Germans were truly considered Romania’s greatest export, as Pacepa alleges, it would be foolish
not to prolong the supply by limiting emigration quotas. The hearings only make mention of
emigration to Israel and the United States. It is unclear whether or not the United States was
aware of West Germany’s dealings with Ceaușescu at this time, as this was before Ion Mihai
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Pacepa’s defection and subsequent tell-all, largely credited with exposing the trade of
Romanian-Germans. In an attempt to ease American concerns, Ceaușescu approved 694 exit
visas to the United States between May and July 1975 and 2,000 visas to Israel from January to
July.108 In return, President Ford waived the emigration requirement and affirmed his faith in the
Romanian government to continue accommodating humanitarian issues.109 Romania’s MFN
status was approved at the end of July 1975, and the Romanian leadership finally obtained what
had been coveted since the rule of Dej.
However, this doesn’t mean that they were no longer subject to pressure from the West
regarding emigration. Rabbi Moses Rosen, president of the Federation of Jewish Communities of
Romania, claimed “[Leaders of the pro-Israel lobby in Washington] did not ask that the MFN
status be withheld from Romania, but that the possibility should always be there so that the
Romanians should be frightened into agreeing to increase the number of Jews leaving for
Israel.”110 Romania’s MFN status was a valuable bargaining chip for the West, just as minority
groups were for Romania. A few years later, they would engage in a game of diplomatic chicken
to see which chip was more valuable.
Before getting to the stand-off of 1982, it is crucial to step back from the diplomatic angle
and dive into Ceaușescu’s need for hard currency and his less-legitimate methods of obtaining
said currency. During negotiations with Romania over the emigration of the Jewish minority,
David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first Prime Minister, wrote in his journal, “you can’t do anything
without money. From top to bottom, even the communist wants money.”111 While the Communist
Party Ben-Gurion refers to pre-dates Ceaușescu, the sentiment only became truer as the decades
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passed and Romania became further estranged from Moscow. In 1960, Warsaw Pact countries
made up roughly two-thirds of Romanian trade, whereas, by 1970, that number was less than
half.112 By choosing to go the independent route, Romania would not be able to rely on the other
Warsaw Pact countries to assist in its economic development, meaning that the acquisition of
hard currency was essential. Favorable trade agreements with the United States were a start, but
the Romanian leadership needed all the money it could get if they were to transform one of the
least industrialized countries in Europe into a competitive economy.
In the early 1970s, Ceaușescu had his hands in a variety
of business ventures, from the already established
agricultural and human exports, to the sale of
diamonds, drugs, and weapons, if Pacepa’s allegations
are to be believed. According to the former Securitate
general, an operation with the codename “Stars'' began
in 1975.113 The goal of the operation was to create
synthetic diamonds (“Stars”) to sell abroad. Pacepa
alleges that Ceaușescu told the DIE (Securitate) “to sell
the ‘Stars’ secretly on the Western market - the same
way it does with the cocaine in transit from Asia to Europe that we confiscate at the border.”114
While the claims of drug trafficking have not been verified, Pacepa states that both Romania and
Bulgaria engaged in the smuggling of drugs to Western Europe.115 If this is true, it strongly
illustrates Ceaușescu’s willingness to acquire foreign currency at all costs and places him
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somewhere between world leader and organized crime boss. One might ask how a self-professed
communist leader could engage in these activities. Ceaușescu’s answer would be, “Marx and
Lenin have taught us that anything is ethical, so long as it is in the interest of the proletarian class
and its world revolution.”116 Therefore, there was no such thing as ill-gotten gains or dirty
money, as long as it went towards the betterment of the Romanian state. The merits of this
statement are very much up for debate, but it helps establish the mindset of the Romanian leader.
Given the secrecy around the deals, information on the movement of funds is somewhat
scarce, though Ion Mihai Pacepa provides a description of the process in Red Horizons:
“The money the DIE obtained from the West in the form of cheques or bank transfers,
which could be legally controlled, was immediately deposited at the Romanian Bank of
Foreign Trade, known as BRCE, and credited to the national budget. But the money
obtained by the DIE in hard cash - most of it from the export of Jews and Germans - was
recorded only in Ceaușescu’s TA accounts. Cash received in other currency was
exchanged into dollars, usually in Zurich. The dollar bills received from Bonn and Tel
Aviv were first laundered into new ones, in case the numbers had been recorded, and then
were kept in a DIE underground vault. It constituted Ceaușescu’s secret slush fund, and
he occasionally withdrew money from it, buying Western cars for his children or ordering
a custom-built, armored Mercedes for himself - outlays that were kept secret in Romania.
He also used the money for Elena’s diamond collection and for the jewelry she bought
during her official visits abroad. So far he had spent no more than $4 million from this
fund, a negligible sum compared to the total amount accumulated, which was in the
neighborhood of $400 million.”117
If there were in fact different routes for cash and banknotes, it makes sense that the Romanian
side would include the conditions that they did, such as that roughly 50% of the payments be
made in hard cash. One Securitate document supports the existence of multiple avenues, showing
that of a 29,000,000 DM payment by West Germany in May 1973, 17,400,000 DM went into the
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Romanian Bank of Foreign Trade, while 11,600,000 DM went into an account TN 73, one of the
two private accounts.118 It is stated that, as of December 29 1975, account TN 73 contained
$18,125,720 ($89,239,523 in 2021), while TN 75 contained $1,627,908 ($8,014,784).
Additionally, $24,640,517 ($121,314,242) was taken from TN 73, including a $13.5 million loan
to the Romanian Bank of Foreign Trade and $1,227,000 towards the factory for Operation Stars.
This could suggest that the money in these supposedly personal accounts was used, at least in
part, to benefit the Romanian economy rather than simply to buy Elena Ceaușescu’s jewelry, as
Pacepa asserts. However, this money could have just as easily wound up in the hands of the
Ceaușescus.
Teodor Meleșcanu, who worked in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gave a
statement in 1991, saying “the sums of money that the German side paid for each ethnic German
were deposited in a Swiss bank in Basel in two accounts. One of the accounts was also open to
Romanian enterprises, and the other was known only to those who made the payments and to the
trusted members of the Ceaușescu family.”119 This conclusion, which actually describes the funds
acquired post-1978, aligns very closely with Pacepa’s recollection of the pre-1978 money trail.
The question of how large each account was is still very much up for debate, but the existence of
multiple Swiss bank accounts containing foreign currency is not.
Following Pacepa’s defection to the United States in 1978, Ceaușescu completely
reorganized the Securitate. As part of this, he created a new department specifically dedicated to
the acquisition of foreign currency, known as Aport Valutar Special (AVS), which roughly
translates to Special Foreign Currency Contribution. In 1990, Colonel Octavian Stelian Andronic
described the purpose of this division to the government commission: “During 1981-1985, I

118
119

Florica Dobre, 194.
Dan Badea, Cornel Nistorescu. Averea Presedintelui : Conturile Ceaușescu. (1998): 99.

53

worked at UM 0544 as the head of the AVS department, whose primary objective was: bringing
foreign currency into the country resulting from the successions and other rights of Romanian
citizens, accounting and transfer to special accounts from BRCE (TN-73, TN-75, OV-80, etc.) of
the amounts resulting from the agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel on
emigration, the execution of foreign currency operations without export of goods, and obtaining
commissions from various foreign trade operations.”120 Both Andronic and his successor,
Constantin Anghelache, met with Dr. Hüsch on numerous occasions and played a vital role in the
negotiations. Andronic’s admission that the departure of Germans and Jews from Romania was
part of a larger effort to acquire foreign currency, which did, in fact, end up in the Swiss bank
accounts, reiterates what Pacepa and others already suggested; the Romanian-Germans were
viewed as an export commodity, perhaps no different than oil or agricultural products.
Having established the importance of hard currency to Ceaușescu and the Securitate,
perhaps it should come as no surprise that they would continue to milk every last dollar or mark
out of the departures. Passed in October 1982, Decree 402 nearly ruined Romania’s emigration
dealings with West Germany and Israel, as well as its Most Favored Nation status with the
United States. The decree stated that all emigrants would be required to pay back the cost of their
education and other social welfare in foreign currency to the Romanian state after leaving,
putting them in debt to the oppressive regime they had just escaped. The debts varied depending
on educational attainment: 2 year secondary school was $3,700 ($9,800), 4 year secondary
school was $7,400 ($19,600), 2 year technical university was $11,100 ($29,400), 4 year
university was $22,150 ($58,700), medical school was $29,900 (76,800), those with a degree in
arts, architecture, or conservatory $35,800 ($94,800), doctor of technical sciences $33,950
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($89,900), and medical doctor $39,900 ($106,000).121 On top of this, Article 4 mandates that
from the time of approval of the exit visa until the actual departure of the country, those who will
emigrate will be treated as foreign citizens and required to pay for expenses using foreign
currency.122 Understandably, West Germany and Israel were upset with this development, feeling
as if the Romanians had changed the terms of the agreement without any warning or
consultation.
On December 21, 1982, Dr. Hüsch met with Stelian Octavian Andronic, the Securitate
colonel who acted as the Romanian representative in the negotiations at the time, at the
Intercontinental Hotel in Bucharest.123 A number of issues were to be discussed, but most
pressing was the newly passed decree. Dr. Hüsch explained that the German side felt as if the
decree was a slap in the face, considering how beneficial the relationship with West Germany
had been to Romanian diplomacy. Andronic asserted that the decree applied to all citizens,
regardless of ethnic origin or destination country, and was not aimed specifically at the
Germans.124 Additionally, Andronic explained that the Romanian state felt as if they were getting
the short end of the stick by investing in their citizens’ education only to have them leave the
country.125 While Andronic’s point stands, as under a communist system there is a large
investment in every citizen that only pays off if that citizen uses their education to contribute to
society, Hüsch refuted this by emphasizing that this was already accounted for, hence the
payments being made by West Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany agreed to pay a set
price based on age and education precisely to offset the brain drain and loss on investment for the
Romanians. With this new decree, Romania would be double or, as we’ll get to soon, even triple
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dipping. Regarding the status of children and the elderly under this new decree, Andronic
affirmed that the decree only applies to students and graduates of working age, though any
professional currently working must pay the full amount, regardless of how many years of
service they completed in Romania.126
Hüsch continued by reminding Andronic that the Federal Republic was also paying the
pensions of the Romanian-German emigrants, something that was technically the responsibility
of Romania.127 Andronic countered this by pointing out that it was West Germany’s choice
whether or not to pay those pensions and that the societal value they were receiving from an
influx of educated, German-speaking migrants justifies the price. However, the German records
reveal that this was not the case in their eyes, saying “the Romanian side is completely wrong
about the value of a Romanian education. Obviously, it is not taken into account that there is no
shortage of trained personnel in the Federal Republic of Germany. On the contrary: there is now
unemployment even among qualified workers.”128 The December talks were fairly unproductive
regarding the application of Decree 402, and uncertainty continued into 1983.
On February 15, 1983, Berndt von Staden, the West German State Secretary of the
Foreign Office, met with Lawrence Eagleburger, the American Undersecretary of State of
Foreign Affairs, to discuss Decree 402.129 In the conversation, Eagleburger revealed that the
United States and Israel were just as taken aback by this development as the Germans were. He
speculated that the decree was intended to put pressure on the West, but made it clear that the
Americans were prepared to play hardball with Ceaușescu by terminating Romania’s Most
Favored Nation status. However, this outcome was not desired by any party, as the Americans
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were aware that it would only strengthen Soviet power in Europe by leaving Hungary as the sole
Eastern Bloc country with MFN status. Although the United States, West Germany, and Israel
didn’t need Romania as much as Romania needed them, there was still significant value in
keeping Romania in the role of maverick state. They could afford to lose Romania, but it would
be a painful loss in the fight against the Soviets.
Soon after this meeting, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin decided to halt
negotiations with Romania. With the United States and Israel both taking a stand against Decree
402, the pressure was on West Germany to follow suit. Robert Farrand, the American Deputy
Director of the Office of Eastern European/Yugoslav Affairs at the Department of State,
requested that the West German government make a decision about how to proceed regarding
Romanian-Germans and Decree 402, adding that “the United States has a great interest in
ensuring that German talks with the Romanian side do not undermine the position of the United
States and Israel.”130 It seemed that these negotiations, which had impressively crossed the Cold
War lines, would soon dissolve, as West Germany would retreat to the West and Romania to the
East.
Also straining the West German-Romanian relationship at this time was the issue of
bribes and corruption amongst the lower level Securitate forces. While bribery was frequently
reported by arrivals to West Germany, the government was fairly content to look past these
instances of individual corruption in order to keep the peace, only occasionally issuing gentle
reminders to Bucharest that such practices should not be tolerated. However, in the early 1980s,
reports of bribery increased, and some Romanian-Germans informed German authorities of
organized extortion of prospective emigrants perpetrated by local officials.131 The victims
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provided a few names but remained fairly tight-lipped due to fear of retribution against their
family members who still resided in Romania. One of the identified extortionists was a notary in
Timișoara named Bogdan, who would request 8,000 DM per person, provided by relatives
already living in Germany, in exchange for expediting the process.132 However, it is said that
applicants who did not pay Bogdan this bonus would likely never be approved, so the bribes
were not for special treatment but rather the basic service. The West German report states,
“officially, no Romanian authorities are involved in this procedure, but it was an open secret
among the Romanian Germans that this was an official organization and that the Romanian state
was behind such middlemen.”133 It is also said that while an investigation of Bogdan eventually
took place, the results were inconclusive and he continued his operations. Months later,
complaints about Bogdan and his partners continued, leading Heinz Günther Hüsch to write a
letter to Stelian Octavian Andronic. In this letter, Hüsch provides names, addresses and victim
accounts of several corrupt Securitate officials, including Bogdan. While the tone of the letter is
diplomatic and respectful, it is clear that the Germans were growing increasingly frustrated by
the greed and corruption of the other side, with Hüsch even stating that Bogdan’s quick release
from imprisonment “feeds the assumption that he is actually acting under the cover of official
bodies.”134
Cases like this appear to have been fairly common. As mentioned in the introduction,
Thomas Koch revealed that he paid 8,000DM, the same amount Bogdan is alleged to have
requested, in addition to the 10,000 Lei his brother had already paid in exchange for his exit visa.
According to Thomas, the price doubled to 16,000DM if the person had a degree, a fact absent
from the German records. Though he and his family did not experience the more brutal actions
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of the authorities, many were not as fortunate: “Some were beaten and had the money from their
relatives living in Germany taken from them.”135 One can only speculate on whether Thomas’s
money did, in fact, go to Bogdan or to another corrupt official, but an eerie fact remains. The
events Thomas describes occurred from 1983-1987, long after the various inquiries by the West
German side, meaning that, sadly though perhaps unsurprisingly, no action was taken by the
Romanian government to end these criminal practices.
In addition to financial extortion and beatings, it is suspected that sexual violence and
coercion was frequently used as a tool by the Securitate. This is present in Herta Müller’s novel
The Passport, which tells the story of a Banat Swabian family’s attempt to emigrate to West
Germany.136 The father, Windisch, tries to bribe officials with flour but is told that those in
charge of the paperwork, a militiaman and a priest, will only provide the passport if they are able
to sleep with his teenage daughter Amalie. While Windisch initially refuses, eventually, the
family decides to go through with it, leaving Amalie to pay for her family’s passage with her
body. Though the family is able to achieve physical freedom, the price of that freedom is likely
to haunt them forever. It is a brutal story, and though a work of fiction, it is undoubtedly inspired
by the very real corruption and seediness within the exit process. Specific instances of such
practices are not publicly known, but Heinz Günther Hüsch mentions that many
Romanian-Germans were subject to “the enforcement of sexual acts.”137 The presence of these
arrangements further complicates the debate around whether or not this “family reunification”
agreement should be considered human trafficking. While these negotiations were between two
governments, there is an undeniable criminal element on the lower levels, and it is hard to say
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that the experience of the emigrants was significantly safer or less exploitative than those
trafficked illegally.
Despite these issues, the two sides reached an agreement in May 1983, which would send
thousands of Romanian-Germans to the Federal Republic between July 1983 and June 1988.138
Facing the loss of the diplomatic power they had worked so hard for, the Romanian side
conceded on the issue of Decree 402, marking a win for the West and the thousands hoping to
leave the country. One might be puzzled as to why Romania would risk over a decade’s worth of
diplomacy for a little extra money. The motivation likely had something to do with the economic
situation of Romania in the early 1980s, which was bleak to say the least.
Over the previous 25 years, the Romanian economy had grown significantly, thanks in
large part to Western loans, but by 1981, Romania owed $10 billion in hard currency (roughly
$30 billion in 2021).139 Romania likely saw an opportunity to squeeze more hard currency out of
the deals with West Germany and Israel through Decree 402 to assist in the repayment of debts.
Worrying that Romania’s future would be one of economic slavery to the West, Ceaușescu
prioritized paying off foreign debts as quickly as possible by implementing the infamous
austerity policy. Under the austerity policy, production and exports increased dramatically, while
imports and consumption were severely limited by food and energy rations. Romanians worked
hard to produce more than ever before, but it was all exported, leaving the citizens without much
food, heat, or electricity. Ceaușescu was eventually successful in paying back all debts by the end
of the 1980s, but the living conditions inside Romania had gotten so bad that his fate was all but
sealed. The suffering caused by the austerity policy is often cited as a primary reason for the

138
139

Ibid., 203.
Ronald H. Linden, 367.

60

violent revolution of December 1989, which culminated in the televised execution of Nicolae
and Elena Ceaușescu on Christmas day.
With the fall of the Eastern Bloc in 1989, it’s not surprising that the agreement didn’t
make it to the next decade. The deal was terminated weeks before the Romanian Revolution on
December 4, 1989, when the Romanian side communicated that while they would continue to
assist in family reunification of Romanian-Germans, they no longer wished to engage in
monetized trade or official contractual agreements. Violation of secrecy was cited as the reason
for the cancellation, with Anghelache telling Hüsch, “our opinion is that the Romanian side
complied with all obligations, although the German side did not respect all the terms of the
treaties. This also applies in particular with regard to confidentiality, because there are numerous
publications.”140 While it is true that by the late 1980s, word of the agreements had occasionally
made their way into the press, the West German government had never publicly acknowledged
the deal.
The most revealing report was a 1987 interview in popular German magazine Der
Spiegel with Romanian-German authors Herta Müller and Richard Wagner, in which they laid
just about everything on the table: the government agreements, bribes, extortion, and poor living
conditions.141 In addition to this exposure, Müller also characterized Ceaușescu as an “idiot” and
did not hold back in her criticism of his personality cult and international persona, something that
the Romanian leader surely didn’t appreciate given how meticulously he had crafted his
reputation abroad. However, it was not as if Chancellor Kohl or any other high-ranking West
German politician had made these comments. Perhaps Ceaușescu forgot that, unlike in Romania,
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there was basic freedom of the press in West Germany, so it wasn’t as if everything published
was backed by the state.
While the expectation of confidentiality was a nice thought, it was completely unrealistic
to expect the migration of over 200,000 people to go undiscussed in the public sphere. It would
have been one thing if the exchange of currency occurred only between the two nations, but as
previously referenced, every prospective emigrant was subject to extortion and harassment
before their departure. Threatening relatives left behind may have been enough to silence most of
the departures, but someone was bound to go public eventually.
On top of that, the West German press was not the first place these agreements were
exposed. It was former Securitate general Ion Mihai Pacepa’s Red Horizons that first went into
detail about the ransom of minority groups, as well as numerous other shady practices by the
Romanian leadership. Of course, nobody was more damaged by the release of this book than
Nicolae Ceaușescu, so it wasn’t as if he approved of this information being revealed, but
technically speaking, the first major leak came from the Romanian side. Even if there was a
genuine feeling of betrayal, why would the Romanians wait two years after the Der Spiegel
article to make an issue out of it? The truth is unknown, but there are a couple of theories that
hold weight.
The first theory is that, following the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989,
Ceaușescu knew he would soon have to answer for his decades of ruthless governing. If
questioned about the exit-visa ransom, and perhaps more importantly, the whereabouts of the
funds acquired through this practice, Ceaușescu would likely struggle to produce an answer that
satisfied the Romanian people and the larger international community. After all, it wasn’t as if
Romania was severing ties with West Germany. The only major changes were that they would no
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longer accept payment, and the departures would be on a case-by-case basis, as opposed to the
contracts of before. Perhaps by canceling the monetary agreement, the Romanian side was
attempting to cover its tracks. Of course, there was enough information already out there to make
questions inevitable, rendering this action somewhat useless, but remember: this was 1989. This
was panic mode for the self-proclaimed ‘Genius of the Carpathians’. Besides, it wasn’t as if the
ransom of minority groups was the only thing he would have to answer for. This was a leader
whose economic policies led the country to starve; whose pro-natalist policies endangered
thousands of women through illegal abortions and left many children abused, malnourished, or
dead in the country’s notorious orphanages; this was a leader who tortured and killed political
opponents, who blackmailed and spied on his own citizens.
Another possibility has to do with Romania’s international debt. The year 1989 was also
significant in this regard, as Romania had finished paying off foreign loans early in the year. As
previously alluded to, much of the 1980s was spent focused on eliminating the debt, even if it
meant the Romanian people would go without food, heat, and other necessities. If the ransom of
Romanian-Germans was primarily intended to assist in this repayment, perhaps Romania no
longer felt it necessary to demand compensation after the debts were settled. It should also be
noted that Romania had renounced its Most Favored Nation status with the United States the
year before, suggesting that as the debt decreased, Ceaușescu was preparing to distance Romania
from the West. However, the Romanian negotiator, Colonel Anghelache, explicitly told Hüsch
that this was not the case, saying “there is no relationship between the external debts on the one
hand and the sum paid by the West German side on the other.”142 The validity of this theory is
ultimately predicated on one’s belief about how the money was spent. If one is of the opinion,
like Romanian historians Florian Banu and Florica Dobre, that the money likely went towards
142
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paying off foreign debt, this makes perfect sense. However, following the information about a
personal fund in Switzerland put forward by Pacepa and others, it becomes a bit more difficult to
determine.
It is worth revisiting the question of where the money went, as more information was
revealed following the fall of the Ceaușescu regime. During the brief trial proceeding their
execution, Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescu were questioned about the Swiss accounts, with Nicolae
Ceaușescu insisting, “We had no account in Switzerland. Nobody has opened an account. This
shows again how false the charges are. What defamation, what provocations! This was a coup
d'etat.”143 “If you had no accounts in Switzerland, will you sign a statement confirming that the
money that may be in Switzerland should be transferred to the Romanian state,” the prosecutor
asked in response. Ceaușescu refused to sign any such statement. Even if the majority of the
money did go towards repaying Romania’s foreign debt, the existence of Ceaușescu’s Swiss bank
accounts is not debatable and they were likely still operational, and full of money after his
execution.
It has been suggested by Liviu Turcu, a former Securitate officer that sought asylum in
the United States in January 1989, that the former heads of the AVS department of the Securitate,
Col. Nicolae Anronic and Col. Constantin Anghelache, who both served as negotiation
representatives for the Romanian side during the emigration deals, made trips to Switzerland and
began closing the cover accounts and transferring large sums.144 As if the story needed more
excitement, Turcu notes that Anghelache served as Romania’s delegate to FIFA (yes, that FIFA,
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headquartered in Switzerland), providing him an ideal cover story for frequent trips to
Switzerland, where he could manage the secret accounts.145
Despite the end of communism and the Ceaușescu regime, the post-Ceaușescu Romanian
government was, not unlike West Germany in the post-war period, full of members of the
previous regime with dark pasts. In 1992, Liviu Turcu told the Washington Post that “a very
small group continues to possess the financial resources inherited from the old regime.”146 It
seems somewhat likely that the profits from all of the foreign currency operations, including the
sale of Germans and Jews, wound up in the hands of former Securitate officers, though there is
still mystery surrounding the fate of the Ceaușescu accounts. Considering that, even well into the
21st century, those with ties to the Ceaușescu regime remain politically active in Romania, it is
unlikely that a definitive answer will be given anytime soon.
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CONCLUSION
How should this peculiar arrangement be remembered in the history of these two nations,
as well as the larger Cold War? This unique situation is a testament to the importance of diaspora
and minority status in diplomacy and the construction of nations, as the sale of
Romanian-Germans assisted in the formation of Ceaușescu’s Romania and post-war Germany.
The mere presence of the distinct Romanian-German minority allowed for a diplomatic meeting
point, which in turn helped propel Ceaușescu and Romania into a unique position within a
divided world, as evidenced by the huge diplomatic and financial benefits. It can be argued that
without the sale of Romanian-Germans and Jews, Romania does not achieve the role of a global
mediator, which would have significantly altered Cold War dynamics. Whether shameful or
practical, the agreements leading to the departure of Romanian-Germans were only made
possible by the Transylvanian Saxons’ and Banat Swabians’ preservation of German culture over
centuries.
With this in mind, the huge decline in Romanian-German cultural presence as a result of
the migration can not be ignored. While these deals were the product of distinction and
non-assimilation, they ultimately pushed towards homogenization and the loss of hyphenated or
dual identity. The Romanian-Germans largely assimilated into West German society, while
Romania lost one of its largest ethnic minorities. The Romanian census records are especially
illuminating:147 in 1930, 633,488 Romanian-Germans were counted; in 1966, on the verge of the
first agreement, there were 382,595; by 2002, there were a mere 59,764. Is this a tragic case of
globalization and loss of culture, or rather a natural evolution of diaspora? Perhaps the dual
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identity of Romanian-German served its purpose throughout the 19th and 20th centuries and is
now no longer necessary in the time of the European Union, nation-states, and global migration?
Despite this drastic decline, it is not as if Romanian-German culture has completely
disappeared. The Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania, founded in 1989, remains an
active political party, though it does not have a large presence in the Romanian government.
Despite this, Klaus Werner Iohannis, a Transylvanian Saxon who served as the president of the
Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania, was elected the 5th president of Romania in 2014,
making him the first Romanian president with a minority background. However, President
Iohannis’ parents and sister relocated to Germany in 1992, with Klaus making the active choice
to remain in his country of birth rather than use his heritage to obtain German citizenship.
In addition to the continued presence of Romanians of Saxon or Swabian descent in
politics and society, other forms of German culture live on in Romania. Andras Elek describes a
new incarnation of Romanian-German community: “Now we have a German-speaking group in
my city, made up of Transylvanian Saxons, Banat Swabians, people from Germany, Switzerland,
South Tyrol in Italy. We meet once a month and speak German over dinner. I now have a
German-related social life, which I did not have during the communist times.”148 Additionally, he
also has made it a point to speak to his young son in German to ensure that he is proficient in the
language of his Swabian ancestors, in addition to his already fluent Hungarian and Romanian.
Though Romania may not be the same cosmopolitan melting pot of cultures it was a century ago,
cases like this prove that a multi-ethnic character still exists in the region. With this continuation
of cultural practices, perhaps the story of the Romanian-Germans isn’t finished yet.
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